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Let’s Count and Manage – and Forget the Rest. 
Understanding Numeric Rationalization in  
Human Service Provision 
Ingo Bode ∗ 
Abstract: »Zählen und Managen – und den Rest vergessen. Nummerische Ration-
alisierung von Humandienstleistungen«. In recent times, the development of 
Western welfare states has been strongly influenced by regulatory and mana-
gerial approaches that embody what this special issue refers to as ‘governing by 
numbers’. This article delineates this development by using the example of the 
human service industry in Germany. The analysis is embedded in a macro-
sociological perspective on blurring boundaries between the capitalistic (mar-
ket) economy and the welfare state, arguing that a certain kind of (instrumen-
talist) numeric rationalization has spilled over from the former to the latter and 
sets limits to what is named ‘human development rationality’ within the opera-
tional core of involved organizations. Drawing on case study evidence from 
four different areas, it is shown in which dimensions this movement takes 
shape and how it fosters the crowding-out of elements inherent to this ration-
ality. However, due to the proliferation of ever more ‘perfectionist’ expecta-
tions concerning quality issues, this crowding out provokes various provisional 
organizational and institutional responses. While the latter make production 
processes more volatile overall, there is no end of history regarding the struggle 
between instrumental rationality and countervailing forces within contempo-
rary welfare states. 
Keywords: Social theory, welfare state, instrumental rationality, human devel-
opment, New Public Management, social and healthcare services. 
1.   Introduction 
Over the last two or three decades, major Western welfare states have become 
subject to what this special issue refers to as ‘governing’ or ‘governance by 
numbers’ (Jackson 2011). This reflects a more general trend towards the use of 
metric norms for (re)shaping institutions and organizations in the wider society 
(Espeland and Sauder 2007; Vormbusch 2011; Engle et al. 2015; Rottenburg et 
al. 2015; Mau 2017). In this vein, quantitative indicators have also become 
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employed in various areas of human service provision such as healthcare, edu-
cation, and social support – which reflects the proliferation of a steering mech-
anism that will be labelled ‘numeric rationalization’ throughout this article. 
Being modelled on tools for business process reengineering in the private mar-
ket economy, this mechanism works by various instruments, among which 
funding caps, deadline enforcement, or comparative benchmarking. It focuses 
on tangible aspects in human service endeavour, glossing over the fact that a 
good deal of what makes such endeavour a social intervention proves intangi-
ble in the sense that it is difficult to grasp, measure, and quantify. 
Historically, we are dealing with a new configuration. Granted, regarding 
the modern welfare state, social benefit schemes have always been based on 
numeric standards, materializing in means-tests or (pre-)fixed entitlements. 
Furthermore, such standards have been used for building and maintaining the 
very infrastructure of welfare states, for instance when it came to creating 
amenities or to planning staff and material equipment. However, within many 
of those organizations the welfare state has entrusted with ensuring the well-
being of the citizenry in other than mere economic dimensions, numeric stand-
ards had long been absent from the operational core of the production process. 
The bulk of what can be referred to as human service industry pursued a gen-
eral mission of ‘processing people’ (McKinlay 1975; Hasenfeld 1992) by pur-
poseful interventions viewed as adequate within the confines of extant opera-
tional capacities. The focus was on human development or social reproduction, 
without detailed prescriptions about how to achieve it. 
Meanwhile, however, figures, indicators and metrics have become major 
reference points within that industry (Considine 2001; Gilbert 2002; Tilbury 
2007; Frandsen 2010; Verbeeten et al. 2017; Vrangbæk et al. 2017). The de-
sign, resourcing, and evaluation of service delivery is increasingly subject to 
assessments of inputs and outputs, including where common wisdom suggests 
that these assessments capture the nature of the respective services in rather 
crude ways. This also applies to standardized quality inspection schemes and 
program evaluations, all very popular internationally (Power 1997; Dahler-
Larsen 2017).  
Situated at the intersection of political sociology and organization studies, 
this article provides both a general picture of this movement and a reflection 
about its internal chemistry, with a focus on how, and with which implications, 
numeric rationalization plays out in the operational core of relevant human 
service undertakings. In a nutshell, it is argued that the contemporary human 
service industry is affected by a blurring of boundaries between the welfare 
state and the capitalistic economy. This pressurizes the industry to ‘factor out’ 
intangible elements in its production process although these elements prove 
crucial to the human development of its target groups. At the same time, inter-
nal (or external) stakeholders are facing (or expressing) expectations to make 
services ‘perfect’. Therefore, they attempt to compensate for what is forgotten 
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when a production process is ‘governed by numbers’. This is why human ser-
vice provision eventually becomes volatile – which, in turn, puts considerable 
strain on the involved parties and makes the ‘governing of numbers’ a perma-
nently unfinished endeavour. 
The analysis starts by setting out a theoretical framework that delineates the 
evolving ‘division of labour’ between societal sectors, concentrating on the 
respective role of ‘numbers’ in these sectors. The focus lies on business-like 
management meeting a human service industry that is still expected to yield 
outcomes different from those in the classical market economy. From this theo-
retical reflection, a couple of questions are inferred concerning the implications 
of numeric rationalization, both at public policy level and in relevant organiza-
tional settings. The second part presents (condensed) evidence from four areas 
of human service provision in one big European nation, that is, Germany. The 
analysis is organized around categories prominent in the wider international 
literature exploring the evolving human service industry. Particular attention is 
paid to the encounter of numeric rationalization and rising expectations to 
make services perfect, with this entailing complex coping arrangements at both 
organizational and public policy level. The conclusion contains a reflection 
about driving forces behind the overall development and a short outlook into 
the future.  
2.  Blurred Boundaries? Movements of Rationalization 
across Societal Sectors 
A major theme of modern social theory is how complex societies organize 
themselves in order to ensure social cohesion despite increasing specialization 
and considerable internal heterogeneity. To be sure, the respective scholarship 
disagrees about how social cohesion can be defined, to which extent it is 
achieved, and which mechanisms may contribute to it (Alliot and Lemmert 
2014). However, a good deal of classical social theory departs from the as-
sumption that modern society achieves integration by allocating specific roles 
to several social systems or sectors, each shaped by specific regulations. From 
Marx to Parsons, one important reading was that this implies a clear-cut divi-
sion of labour between the (capitalistic) economy and other societal sectors that 
were institutionally separated from the economic world – although orthodox 
Marxism assumed a tight coupling of the state and capitalistic forces in the 
political arrangement orchestrating this division of labour.  
After Marx, social history was often understood as a process of functional 
differentiation (for many, see Alexander 1997). The market economy appeared 
as a sphere of action dominated by company owners, whereas other societal 
sectors became entrusted with tasks deemed necessary to make that the market 
economy work smoothly. These sectors were meant either to contribute to 
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economic endeavour by fulfilling infrastructural functions (e.g., education) or 
to compensate for the lack of social concern within the economic system (e.g., 
care for the physical well-being). In this understanding, the state (and partners 
from the non-profit sector) took over the role of social reproduction and human 
development (see below) – whereas the economic system, considered as the 
major productive sphere of modern society, was relieved from such responsi-
bilities.  
This reading, focusing on the relationship between the state and the econo-
my, is prominent in various accounts dealing with the modernization of West-
ern society (for many, see Therborn 1996 or Streeck 2012). Importantly, it does 
not imply that, following the advent of the modern welfare state, the terms of 
trade governing the economic system were irrelevant to sectors outside that 
system, given that these sectors were dependent on the latter in material terms, 
with money serving as a means for cross-sectoral integration. For various rea-
sons, however, these accounts suggest – whether implicitly or explicitly – that 
non-economic sectors were sheltered from this system in important respects, in 
particular when it came to procedural issues. The operational, ‘people pro-
cessing’ core of the involved organizations was expected to follow its own 
rationale when assessing concrete needs, applying special knowledge, and 
taking decisions about the type and duration of the action to be taken. 
It can be argued that such functional differentiation connects with the mode 
of rationalization shaping the development of these sectors. From mainstream 
descriptions dealing with the modern capitalistic economy one can infer that the 
latter has seen an ongoing and constantly intensified movement of means-ends-
relations becoming assessed and processed by using numbers in systematic 
ways. This already was a key observation of Max Weber (1978) according to 
whom efforts to extend this mode of rationalization were obvious from early 
industrialism onwards. He saw instrumental rationality as a driving force behind 
the modern economy, connecting with a distinctive cultural configuration aris-
ing with early Protestantism (Weber 1930). In this vein, the compliance with 
operational goals (including yield targets) becomes an essential concern in 
mainstream corporations. Other theories on the internal chemistry of the market 
economy submit that the latter’s core operations reflect a permanent search for 
surplus-income and cost-efficiency, with sophisticated accounting schemes 
monitoring input-output ratios (Slater and Tonkiss 2001). According to Marx, 
the maximization of ‘added value’ to be measured by abstract monetary symbols 
is even fundamental to any organized economic agency in a capitalist world. Be 
it as it may, the overall result is a permanent drive for numeric rationalization.  
Perhaps such narratives overstate the separation between the economic and 
non-economic world, as more recent accounts dealing with the social order of 
capitalist societies would suggest. According to these accounts, regulations 
relevant to non-economic spheres have always been an integral part of the 
economic (capitalistic) system as well. Meanwhile, the latter creatively appro-
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priates elements from non-capitalist sectors – that is, various ‘economies of 
worth’ in the terms of Boltanski and Thevenot (2006) – and uses them for its 
own objectives. A similar understanding can be found in Parson’s system theo-
ry with its emphasis on movements of interpenetration across social systems. It 
also appears in Luhmann’s work that highlights the role of money as a regula-
tory boundary medium connecting otherwise highly heterogeneous social 
spheres (Schimank 2005). However, none of these theories denies that major 
players of the capitalistic economy have from very early on concentrated on 
instrumental rationality translated into abstract, quantified objectives. In private 
business, the achievement of numeric goals is a goal in itself – which has made 
the economic system the homeland of the ‘governing by numbers’. 
Interestingly, social theory, let alone in its classical versions, has paid little 
attention to the question of how rationalization developed in productive sectors 
outside that system, in particular those that received a remit of working with 
human beings in areas such as healthcare, education, and social support. It is 
theories dealing with professionalism, welfare bureaucracies or human service 
organizations that – at least implicitly – provide some insights into the rationale 
that guided the development of these sectors during the 20th century (see e.g., 
Billis 1984; Trattner 1994; Rauschenbach 1990). From this body of work, one 
can infer that the activities in the respective industry, and by extension, the 
agencies meant to orchestrate them, formed a social universe featuring a dis-
tinctive approach to rationality (Kaufmann 2001). This approach was corrobo-
rated by those streams of sociological thinking that came to influence this uni-
verse from very early on by disseminating knowledge about the intricacies of 
social integration. This thinking illuminated the complex interdependence of 
multiple (and sometimes erratic) social factors impacting on human well-being 
(such as unemployment due to economic downturns; poor education in run-
down collectivities; or diseases caused by spatial contagion).  
Internationally, this line of reasoning had its heyday during the 1960s and 
1970s when welfare states and the related infrastructure witnessed a quick 
expansion. Across important sections of public administration and the non-
profit sector (as a partner of the latter) as well as among the emerging welfare 
and medical professions, a distinctive understanding of means-ends-relations 
took shape. Difficulties to assess the precise origin of encountered problems, as 
well as limits in associating inputs with outcomes, were accepted to a large 
degree. Given the complexity of social, mental and physical conditions of 
human life, it was assumed that attempts to organize the production process 
according to standardized means-end-relations would inevitably fail (Baumol 
2012, for the case of healthcare). It was also stressed that operational leeway at 
‘street level’ (the local space in which services must be provided) would be 
indispensable for those dealing with a ‘human case’ (Lipsky 1980; Gofen 
2013). Hence fine-grained calculation of inputs and outputs, as well as perfor-
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mance control based on costs and achievements, were widely absent from their 
day-to-day activities. 
To be sure, this configuration did not involve endless efforts to meet en-
countered needs, nor did it imply that mainstream activities of people-
processing were exempt from shortcomings. Heuristic process management, 
mental short cuts, or rules of thumb were widespread (McKinlay 1975), and 
organizational development was contingent on ‘negotiated orders’ and (micro-) 
political dynamics (Bechky 2011). Yet the rationale sketched above presup-
posed the acknowledgment of what made human services a social intervention 
that contains intangible elements difficult to grasp, measure, and quantify. In 
this sense, the spirit prominent in typical organizational settings of the respec-
tive industry was imbued with what can be labelled ‘human development ra-
tionality’, based on the belief that the means-ends-nexus in these settings 
proves fuzzy in many instances (Hasenfeld 1992). Thus, the human service 
industry of that time was largely sheltered from those forms of numeric ration-
alization that had shaped the capitalistic market economy from its early days. 
During the 1980s, however, the context for human service provision 
changed markedly. First of all, internationally, the capitalistic economy went 
through a sea change (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006; Crouch 2011; Streeck 
2012; Morgan 2016). One element in this transformation was the ‘radicaliza-
tion’ of numeric rationalization, with this affecting both intra- and interorgani-
zational relations. Concerning inter-firm relations, systematic outsourcing and 
the growing role of financial market transactions have contributed to values 
being measured permanently and short-term. This was driven by both techno-
logical options and the deregulation of legal frameworks. Concomitantly, a 
market-driven human resource management took centre stage within many 
standard corporations. Tools such as ‘pay for performance’, management by 
objectives, and internal contracts were predicated on fine-grained input-output 
measurement. They became employed even where objectives were vague (e.g., 
in advertising endeavour), when performance was impossible to attribute (be-
cause it is due to many entangled factors), and for situations in which it proved 
hard to specify contractual provisions (with a given task environment changing 
in unforeseeable ways). 
A further historical turn were changes in public policies regulating the wel-
fare state, dealt with under headlines such as ‘privatization’, ‘marketization’, 
‘New Public Management’, or ‘managerialism’ (for many: Klikauer 2013). 
Claiming ‘value for money’ and meticulous accountability became popular and 
been endorsed by new regulatory tools featuring, among other things, the ad-
mission of commercial firms to the infrastructure used for promoting human 
development (or ensuring social reproduction), as well as competitive service 
provision based on public tendering and internal or quasi-markets (Pollitt 2011, 
Bode and Brandsen 2014, Hyndman and Liguon 2016). What this brought to 
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the fore was a general blurring of boundaries between the capitalistic economy 
and the welfare state (Bode 2012a; forthcoming). 
This movement becomes particularly discernible when looking at the con-
temporary public and organizational discourse around human service provision. 
Both public programs and service providers have adopted the language of the 
private market economy. Administrative and service-delivering entities have 
been relabelled ‘enterprises’, users are labelled ‘costumers’, and key areas of 
human service provision have become conceived of as being a ‘service market’ 
(see examples below). In areas such as healthcare, social support or education, 
concepts propagating entrepreneurialism, marketing, surplus revenue genera-
tion and the like have proliferated far and wide. With this movement, quantita-
tive indicators are supposed to take centre stage in the human service industry, 
with ambitions to use them for governing and overseeing the production pro-
cess, and more generally for enforcing compliance with political or administra-
tive targets (Frandsen 2010; Soss et al. 2011). As mentioned in the introduction 
to this special issue, one aim of such indicators consists of making social phe-
nomena visible that cannot be observed directly, to ensure that otherwise latent 
phenomena can become subject to deliberate managerial agency (Bartl, Pap-
illoud, and Terracher-Lipinsky 2019). From this perspective, the new context 
of human service provision proves fertile to a ‘governing by numbers’ penetrat-
ing the operational core of major organizational settings. 
At the same time, relevant organizations from the human service industry 
have become exposed to a radicalization of expectations concerning their 
performance. In general, throughout that industry and the related welfare state 
environment, the understanding of quality still differs from the approach pre-
vailing in the capitalistic economy. In the latter, outputs are only expected to be 
in line with what customers know, want and may become enticed to. By con-
trast, in contemporary Western welfare states, social intervention is meant to be 
effective at any rate and for any citizen. Typical examples include acute 
healthcare or child protection. Should a given way of social intervention be 
found impeding this mission in obvious ways, one can expect public disquie-
tude and pressures to contain the ensued damage. Hence the distinctive function 
of human services seems to remain a public concern, as can be inferred from 
international opinion polls (see e.g., Sachweh 2016).  
Nowadays, popular expectations are perfect service delivery and ‘no one left 
behind,’ at least in some areas (Dean 2015). While this conforms to the norma-
tive foundations of the classical approach to ‘human development rationality’ 
in the above sense, both numeric rationalization and the primacy of instrumen-
tal rationality related to it come into play here as well. This is epitomized by 
quality assurance schemes that are proliferating world-wide for some time now 
(Dahlen-Larsen 2017). These schemes are often operated by inspection bodies 
that check the actual outputs of service providers and take action against those 
that (allegedly) fail to deliver what could have been achieved in theory. Exam-
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ples can be found in the healthcare industry (van der Pennen et al. 2015), in 
medical rehabilitation (Kersten et al. 2015), or in the area of family interven-
tion featuring ‘increasingly econometric assessments limited to measurable 
quantitative and 'transformative' indicators of efficacy’ (Batty and Flint 2012, 
356). 
Seen from this angle, the context of contemporary human service provision 
is imbued by ‘institutional ambiguity’ (see Bode 2015), including when it 
comes to the role of rationality. This begs the question as to how relevant 
stakeholders of the human service industry handle numeric rationalization. The 
institutionalization of numeric mechanisms in the steering and evaluation of 
collective action as well as concepts for ‘reading’ and using messages behind 
figures are of particular interest here. A more general question is about how 
this affects the division of work between the welfare state and the capitalistic 
economy. 
For dealing with this question, a special theoretical lens on the intersection 
of public norms and organizational responses proves helpful, namely the per-
spective adopted by what has become known as organizational institutionalism 
(Scott et al. 1911; Greenwood et al. 2017). This approach directs our awareness 
to both societal rules shaping collective action and the role of sector-specific 
organizations that interpret, implement and (sometimes) bend rules by ‘institu-
tional work’ (Lawrence 2009). It also provides a macro perspective on rational-
ization focusing on ‘institutionalized’ pressures on societal sectors concerning 
both economic (means-end) rationalization and socio-cultural modernization 
(Meyer et al. 1994). While the former is driven by instrumental rationality (in 
the above sense), neo-institutionalist accounts understand socio-cultural mod-
ernization as a movement through which greater emphasis is placed on values 
such as human dignity of human beings and individualism. The amplification 
of the human rights agenda at global level and the universalization of basic 
entitlements to public services such as healthcare are often viewed to epitomize 
such modernization (Heartley 2015; Böhm 2017). It is important to see that this 
movement chimes with the idea if ‘human development rationality’, but also 
with the aforementioned drive towards ‘perfectionism’. 
Whereas such developments are nicely captured by neo-institutionalist ac-
counts (e.g., those engaging with the so-called world-polity theory, see Brom-
ley and Meyer 2017), the latter are rather silent when it comes to the question 
of what happens if ‘human development rationality’ meets numeric rationaliza-
tion. This is why one has to dig deeper when studying changes of both regula-
tory foundations of human service provision and collective action in typical 
organizational settings. Key questions for such endeavour are: 
- What are typical manifestations of business-like numeric rationalization 
in relevant areas of human service provision? 
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- Which implications are discernible at organization level, given both the 
leeway left to street level action and persisting (classical) expectations 
concerning the promotion of human development? 
- Which conclusions can be drawn in terms of theories dealing with func-
tional differentiation in Western societies? 
3. Numeric Rationalization in the German Human Service 
Industry: Manifestations and Implications 
Recent international studies on the evolving human service industry, covering 
areas such as healthcare, elderly care, social work and support to jobseekers 
(education is not considered further here), bear witness to global movements of 
change, although this change occurs in various forms and to different degrees 
(Spratt et al. 2015; Martinelli et al. 2017; Marchal and van Mechelen 2017; 
Vrangbæk et al. 2017). Thus, some sections of that industry have been trans-
ferred to private businesses that pro-actively adopt technologies from the 
‘mainstream’ capitalistic economy, including new steering tools and output 
control systems – that thereby become popular within the entire industry. Fur-
thermore, regulatory welfare state agencies have adopted methods from the 
private market economy, namely: competitive contracting based on quantified 
deliverables; prices attached to distinctive service operations; quality control 
based on output indicators. Finally, all types of providers (whether public, non-
profit or for-profit) carve out ways to both conform to these new ‘rules of the 
game’ and maintain core operations in line with their classical mission – which 
implies tensions at organization level that intrinsically connect with the trends 
towards ‘governing’ or ‘governance by numbers’. 
Research on the respective dynamics is still in its infancy. In what follows, 
findings from work conducted by the author of this article and various associ-
ates (Bode 2010, 2015, Bode et al. 2017; Bode et al. 2013; Aiken and Bode 
2009; Bode 2014; Bode 2012b; Breimo et al. 2017) are used to describe recent 
developments in Germany. According to a widely held view, this is a country 
in which changes to both the political economy and the administration of the 
welfare state have been less radical than elsewhere. Thus, Hammerschmid and 
Oprisor (2016), dealing with the influence of New Public Management, submit 
that, in this country, the latter has proved a ‘difficult terrain for management 
ideas and instruments’ breaking with the traditional settlement. So if ‘numeric 
rationalization’ is found to matter even in this context, its penetrating power 
becomes particularly evident. 
The following analysis covers four different areas of the human service in-
dustry and is meant to highlight commonalities rather than differences. It draws 
on a couple of multiple case studies (in the sense of Stake 2006) that all had a 
qualitative design. The emphasis was placed on changing regulatory frame-
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works, public and organizational discourse, and the sense-making of stakehold-
ers involved in the production process. Samples embraced up to 15 providers in 
a given area of human service provision. The bulk of the data was collected by 
problem-centred interviews with middle managers and street-level profession-
als. Hermeneutic content analysis was applied to exploit these data. In addition, 
experts representing the areas at large (from associations at sector level or from 
government bodies) were interviewed to corroborate findings from the selected 
organizational settings. Concerning the evidence used for this article, the focus 
lies on manifestations of numeric rationalization as reported by relevant re-
spondents, on the one hand, and the perceived implications associated with 
them, on the other. 
Table 1: Manifestations of Numeric Rationalization in Four Human Service 
Industries 
Sector Type of Organization Regulation Governance at Organization Level
Healthcare 
Public Management  
sickness funds 
∗ ‘price tags’ and pay-for-
performance 
∗ contracts & cost  
monitoring 
reorganization towards  
a ‘true enterprise’…. 
- key account managers 
- targets, p4p … 
Providers  
example: hospitals 
∗ lump sum prices (DRGs) 
∗ economic risk with  
providers 
∗ case-based accounting 
∗ human resource management 
geared towards ‘market suc-
cess’ (p4p etc.) 
Eldercare 
Public Management  
LCT-funds/LA’s 
∗ contracts based on  
fixed gross budgets 
∗ negotiated prices, per time unit 
similar to above (first line) 
Providers  
example: home care 
∗ direct payments (according to 
degrees of need) 
∗ full risk with providers 
∗ strictly clocked work plans 
∗ just-in-time workforce 
Job  
integration 
Public Management  
labour administra-
tion / regional 
centres 
∗ public tendering & fixed-term 
contracts with output control 
∗ numeric monitoring across all 
boards 
∗ reorganization towards a ‘true 
enterprise’… 




∗ lump sum prices (per ‘out-
contracted’ case) 
∗ full economic risk with  
providers 
∗ strict internal accounting 
∗ just-in-time workforce 
Child  
protection 
Public Management  
Local authorities 
∗ measures based on informal 
budget caps 
∗ contracts featuring rough quality 
targets 
 
∗ ‘financial departments’ moni-
toring outlays per case 





∗ payments per place / package of 
hours (fixed term) 
∗ risk with providers, yet often 
stable local networks 
∗ flexible work regime  
∗ management of ‘cases’ in 
accordance with ‘vacancies’ 
 
 
HSR 44 (2019) 2 │  141 
Manifestations of numeric rationalization were found at two levels and for two 
archetypes of organizations. The two levels comprise public regulation and 
organizational governance; the two archetypes are public management agencies 
and providers. In the remainder of this section, findings concerning these levels 
and organizations can only be summarized in rough terms, given the space 
limits of a journal article. For the same reason, observations are not substantiat-
ed by references at each instance (they are all contained in the sources listed 
above). Table 1 and 2 display findings pertaining to inpatient care, domiciliary 
eldercare, job integration measures, and child protection. 
Regarding healthcare, first of all, its public management in Germany is 
largely devolved upon sickness funds (Krankenkassen). The current regulation 
makes them operate as social insurance units with a public administration man-
date. Concerning inpatient care, they have a remit to (co-)organize a payment 
scheme in which disorders are assigned fixed unitary prices and allocated to 
‘diagnosis related groups’ (DRGs), with the funding perceived by providers 
following the number of (DRG) cases under treatment (however, costs for 
nursing will no longer be included in this system from 2020 onwards). In addi-
tion, for the (small) area of integrated healthcare projects in which hospitals 
can collaborate with other providers such as pharmacies or rehabilitation ser-
vices, sickness funds negotiate selective contracts. These contracts often exhib-
it benchmarks for the costs incurred per patient even as actual expenses are 
subject to scrupulous comparative monitoring. In the near future, sickness 
funds will be entitled to remunerate inpatient care providers on a pay-for-
performance (p4p) basis, meaning that the funding of a given activity depends 
on achievements such as a low rate of complications following a surgery. It is 
noteworthy that sickness funds compete among each other for enrolees and 
have an interest to offer them low contribution rates (insurance premiums). It is 
against this background that, over the last two or three decades, they have 
pushed for numeric rationalization in various respects. Accordingly, their in-
ternal governance has changed profoundly. Posts for key account managers 
have been created; internal targets and performance-related salaries are com-
mon.  
This corresponds with developments affecting healthcare providers such as 
hospitals. As the afore-mentioned ‘DRG scheme’ devolves the full economic 
risk upon entities that (equally) operate in a competitive landscape, balance 
sheets become a day-to-day concern here. Consequently, German hospitals 
have gone through comprehensive ‘business reengineering’ during the last 
decades. Conceiving of themselves as fully-fledged enterprises, they have 
established sophisticated accounting tools whereby they continuously compare 
income and outlays per patient. Staff specializing in numeric controlling recur-
rently confronts doctors with such information. Moreover, the output-input 
ratio per medical department has become a key issue for top executives. Hu-
man resource policies are geared towards ’market success’, with performance-
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related pay (usually for chief physicians and line managers) being a key lever 
for this. 
The eldercare sector has felt the same wind of change. As for regulation, 
service provision is based either on contracts between providers and (public) 
purchasers in which gross budgets are calculated on ‘cases’ – this pertains to 
residential care – or on prices per time unit spent for service delivery in the 
area of domiciliary care. Prices are negotiated between independent providers 
(for-profit and non-profit) and both the long-term care insurance and represent-
atives of local authorities. Payers use to be quite powerful in these talks even 
though they appear less entrepreneurial than the sickness funds, given that there 
is no competition for enrolees in this branch of the German social insurance 
system. Market dynamics are nonetheless quite strong in this area, affecting 
providers in various ways. While the residential sector embraces a number of 
companies traded on stock markets, undertakings in the domiciliary care (sub-) 
sector are exposed to strong ‘pressures to sell’. Their income depends on how 
beneficiaries use the benefits granted by the long-term care (social) insurance 
after a need assessment. With this direct payment, users can freely – and recur-
rently – select a company from a large range of competing providers. The latter 
incur considerable economic risks and tend to organize the work flow under a 
tough time regime. Just-in-time management is imperative, according to metic-
ulous planning based on numeric targets. 
These targets proves even more vital for the German labour administration, 
notably when it comes to supporting jobseekers on their way back into gainful 
employment (e.g., by providing training, work experience, social advice). The 
regulation in force incites regional units of the responsible national agency to 
contract independent service providers after public tendering. Fixed-term 
agreements specify their tasks in very precise terms. Payments or the renewal 
of contracts in the subsequent round of tendering depend upon quantitative 
assessments, e.g., concerning the share of jobseekers integrated back into the 
labour market. In terms of public administration, this implies numeric monitor-
ing across all boards. Concerning providers, many of those that offer the re-
spective services have ended up as quasi-commercial enterprises that tend to 
select potential users according to their assumed ‘pay-off’, a management tool 
referred to as ‘creaming’ in the expert literature. Far and wide, these service 
providers tend to organize the work flow in line with this volatile contract 
regime, e.g., by recruiting freelancers and fixed-term staff. 
In mainstream social work, such tendencies are less pronounced. However, 
taking the example of child protection, one can see that numeric rationalization 
does come into play here as well. The current regulation (at national level) is 
not very explicit about the terms of service provision. However, it contains 
provisions on quality assurance that must be included in contracts agreed be-
tween local authorities (LA’s) and independent providers (family help services, 
for instance). The actual public management of child protection lies with local 
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welfare offices. In some places, the latter impose informal caps on outlays per 
intervention (e.g., outreach family help) or on the amount of measures to be 
commissioned to independent (non-statutory) providers during a certain period 
of time. More generally, agreements with independent providers frequently 
contain numeric standards (e.g., lump-sum payments per case; time limits to 
domiciliary family support). In addition, the financial departments of many 
welfare offices monitor expenses per case to infer conclusions about the as-
sumed utility of mandated measures. Concerning providers, those involved in 
outreach work receive payments for a prescribed ‘package of hours’ on a fixed-
term basis and have to come to terms with volatile income streams. Although 
many providers manage to collaborate in local networks (embracing both peer 
organizations and public authorities) to facilitate long-term agreements on 
prices and conditions of service supply, flexible hours and fixed-term jobs are 
widespread in this area. While welfare departments often set time limits to 
mandated measures, some providers try to retain ‘cases’ longer than intended 
because they do not receive much funding in case of vacancies. 
Thus, across quite diverse sectors, similar movements are discernible. The 
welfare state orchestrates a ‘governing by numbers’ at various instances while 
organizations offering human services on its behalf instil the respective ra-
tionale into their work settings. Interorganizational relations (e.g., between 
sickness funds and healthcare providers) become imbued with ‘numeric reason-
ing’, in particular when it comes to designing contracts and output control 
schemes. This reasoning also affects the intraorganizational governance by 
both public administration units and managers of service providers. As the 
regulation in force devolves a good deal of economic risk on these providers, 
the latter make ample use of numeric standards to control the production pro-
cess – be it by temporal prescriptions; the alignment of budgets and service 
hours; or pay according to prefixed targets and measured outputs. Their human 
resource management is geared towards exploiting opportunities given by the 
(labour) market, by imposing dispersed working hours, flexible work contracts, 
and reduced effort devoted to activities of which effects are difficult to assess. 
All this tends to ‘discipline’ those professionals who otherwise would have 
greater leeway to work with clients according to case-specific considerations, 
that is, with street-level discretion in the above sense. 
It is difficult to provide ‘hard data’ on the implications this mode of ‘gov-
erning by numbers’ has had in terms of outcomes for users – let alone in a long 
term perspective that matters most when it comes to human development. Also, 
the entire range of implications of NPM and related patterns of organizational 
governance in the human service industry cannot be discussed within the con-
fines of this article. However, the available evidence hints to ‘forgotten con-
cerns’, that is, elements that get lost with numeric rationalization proliferating 
in the areas under study. Again, only an overview of the respective findings can 
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be provided; it is summarized in a list of observations reported by experts and 
informants from the industry (see Table 2 below, left column).  
In healthcare, it seems difficult to ensure the continuity of service provision 
across sub-sectors such as rehabilitation, out-patient care, domiciliary nursing, 
and psycho-social treatment. Quantitative benchmarks incite providers to con-
centrate on what is measured by their own hierarchy. In many instances, ‘soft’ 
support – such as personal assistance for patients; conversation with relatives; 
attention paid to psychosomatic dimensions of the healing course – is at a pre-
mium, given an ever more ‘Taylorized’ production process. In eldercare, dom-
iciliary care workers can stay with users only during a prefixed amount of time 
(sometimes only 15 minutes), concentrating on body-related tasks at the ex-
pense of personal care. Further activities are often left to separate providers, 
e.g., in home help or dementia care; these providers are operating under similar 
restrictions, however. Altogether, services use to be poorly integrated even as 
spontaneous needs are covered only accidentally. Concerning job integration 
projects initiated by the labour market administration, the production process 
is infused with a ‘work first’ orientation that glosses over the wider circum-
stances under which jobseekers participate in these projects. The involved 
professionals are impeded to pursue a ‘life first’ approach that consists of ac-
companying users along a trajectory interconnecting various services (illness 
prevention; social support; training; family counselling etc.). As regards child 
protection, welfare offices often feel unable to keep track of ‘cases’ they have 
been concerned with. Given a fragmented and volatile chain of interventions, 
information across various providers and neighbouring sectors (such as 
healthcare and social work) is hard to get. Putting their faith in output monitor-
ing schemes and formalized reporting tools, they risk missing essential parts of 
the story around a given client, crucial to influence his or her future perspec-
tives. Moreover, services are perceived to become more rudimentary, due to the 
more extensive use of both fixed-term measures and outsourcing. 
Overall, a good deal of the complexity inherent to human development 
seems to get lost in the ‘governing’ of the sectors under study and their organi-
zations. However, as organizational institutionalism suggests, formal prescrip-
tions are not the final word. Actors involved in policy-making, on-site man-
agement or service provision perceive shortcomings and try to cope with them 
in one way or another – which hints to a second set of implications that came to 
the fore in the research undertaken. In fact, rules can be bent by those who 
maintain leeway in the production process, and policies may react on what 
numeric rationalization in human service provision is perceived to bring about. 
Findings from the aforementioned research projects suggest that such coping 
behaviour occurs in various ways; again, they can be portrayed only in rough 
terms within the confines of this article (see the right column in Table 2, the 
included observations apply to several of the sectors under study here). The 
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focus lies on the production process at street level and on the evolving public 
regulation (public management as such is not examined further here). 
Concerning healthcare, first of all, activities that, due to the ‘governing by 
numbers’, are abandoned in one organization or one sector may be taken over 
elsewhere. This can be observed with regard to rehabilitation services – alt-
hough the latter may not always be able to repair shortcomings of acute care 
institutions. Moreover, relevant professions in the hospital sector exhibit self-
exploitation behaviour, materializing in work intensification, extra-hours, or 
the acceptance of extraneous tasks. Furthermore, relatives (if available) are 
frequently invited or even urged to compensate for the lack of attention that 
emanates from the tough time regime for professionals in the wards. As regards 
public policy-making, ‘relief programs’ established from time to time (e.g., 
those entailing extra funding for inpatient nursing) enhance organizational 
slack needed to meet an unexpected workload per case. Concerning eldercare, 
similar dynamics are salient. In this area, staff and relatives seek and find pro-
visionary solutions when being exposed to unforeseen needs, sometimes at the 
expense of their own well-being. At public policy level, programs have been 
launched to promote low-skilled personal assistance to users affected by de-
mentia in order to alleviate the workload care workers; the respective services, 
however, remain institutionally separated from mainstream providers. As re-
gards job integration measures orchestrated by the labour market administra-
tion, it can be observed that organizations running a measure (have to) devolve 
tasks upon other instances such as charity projects (e.g., volunteer coaches) if 
these are available. Moreover, following the end of one measure, participants 
are often shifted to a new scheme, e.g., one addressing special target groups 
such as refugees. Dovetailing interventions in this way appears widespread, 
driven by public policies that invent new (fixed-term) programs again and 
again. Concerning child protection, the professions involved in this sector tend 
to compensate for the lack of time and ‘organizational patience’ by informally 
allocating extra time to complex cases (while engaging less with routine work). 
Furthermore, agents of welfare departments, when facing time or budget caps 
for a certain kind of social support, use options to move a ‘case’ to a neigh-
bouring welfare sector (e.g., one for psychiatric patients or disabled people). 
Likewise, public authorities have launched new – often experimental – pro-
grams by which the welfare state can delegate tasks to novel occupations (such 
as ‘family midwives’) or on community work projects, both meant to provide 
‘light-touch’ services to families facing social problems. 
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Table 2: Implications of Numeric Rationalization 
Sector Forgotten Concerns 
Coping with Perceived Shortcomings 
∗ Organizational Improvisation 
→ Institutional Improvisation 
Healthcare 
∗ continuity of care 
∗ ‘soft’ support 
∗ psychosomatic dimensions 
∗ devolving tasks upon neighbouring 
sectors 
∗ self-exploitation of staff 
→ public ‘relief programs’ increasing slack 
(for a while) 
∗ using relatives (if available) 
→ policies funding low-skilled personal 
assistance by separate agencies 
∗ dovetailing interventions (for the same 
user) 
→ special programs (for target groups) 
∗ staff investing extra-time for selected 
clients 
∗ shifting ‘cases’ to other programs 
→ public policies promoting new / experi-
mental light-touch occupations / pro-
jects  
Eldercare 
∗ integrated service provision 
∗ personal care 
∗ spontaneous needs 
Job integration 
∗ life first, assistance across 
various social spheres 
∗ long-term support 
Child protection 
∗ the story around a ‘case’ 
∗ future perspectives of clients 
∗ cross-sectoral intervention 
 
Altogether, across the four areas, there is evidence of numeric standards not 
being (fully) applied for some users and on some occasions, as long as this 
appears appropriate and doable at street level. Thus, in the terms of organiza-
tional institutionalism, institutional work is widespread. However, in the long 
run, this may have repercussions on the morale of the affected organizations. 
Thus, devolving responsibilities upon other sectors can turn out to be a boom-
erang, as clients often return to the same hospital or family support scheme – 
which makes staff experience recurrent frustration. Furthermore, much of what 
is accomplished when coping with numeric rationalization proceeds informally; 
this creates enduring stress as it often comes with work overload and requires 
activities going beyond one’s job description. Organizational improvisation 
appears to be a ‘silver bullet’ in many instances, yet the solutions found are 
rarely sustainable.  
This experience sits uneasily with rising expectations concerning the quality 
of human service provision (see section 1), also because existing output control 
schemes do often not satisfy these expectations. The eldercare sector is a case 
in point: A sophisticated monitoring tool meant to rank service providers ac-
cording to measured service outputs was – some years after its creation – 
strongly challenged by experts and abandoned thereafter. Public policies fre-
quently react to publicly discussed shortcomings by sporadic programs meant 
to inhibit some of the effects produced by numeric rationalization. These pro-
grams contain measures for earmarked purposes and limited periods of time. 
Examples include the temporal injection of extra-money to re-staff hospitals; 
the promotion of a new low-skilled workforce to enrich mainstream eldercare 
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with personal assistance; support schemes for selected target groups among 
jobseekers; and the provisionary admission of a new occupation (such as a 
‘family midwife’) to fill existing gaps in child protection services. This mode 
of compensation can be labelled ‘institutional improvisation’. It responds to 
disquietude arousing within the public sphere, and sometimes to industrial 
action taken by the affected professions. It is striking, however, that regulatory 
changes setting limits to numeric rationalization have remained an exception 
thus far. 
4. Conclusions: Governing by Numbers in the 
Contemporary Welfare State – An Unfinished History 
Dealing with the ‘governing by numbers’ in current Western welfare states, this 
article has reviewed evidence from the German human service industry to shed 
light on both the implications of this movement and responses to the latter. The 
findings suggest that numeric rationalization deeply affects the arrangement of 
services that are meant to ensure a decent development of human beings over 
their life course. Steering by proxies, standardized output evaluation, and ef-
forts to calculate the incalculable (e.g., the time needed to support a person 
with complex problems) are widespread in both public management and the 
organization of service delivery. Penetrating the operational core of relevant 
settings, this movement makes instrumental rationality crowd out what has 
been referred to in this article as ‘human development rationality’. 
Concerning both regulation and organizational action, the official mantra 
today is ‘let’s count and manage’ service provision by using quantitative indi-
cators wherever possible. In so doing, public management (as rolled out by 
sickness funds or the labour market administration, for instance) ‘blanks out’ 
complexities inherent to the production process in the human service industry. 
Facing such policies, provider organizations often display an opportunistic 
behaviour, e.g., when incorporating the target regime, embarking on business 
reengineering, and committing themselves to deliver ‘value for money’. In this 
vein, the implicit motto is: ‘let’s forget the rest’ of what is crucial for pursuing 
‘human development rationality’ – that is, the role of intangible elements in the 
process of social intervention; the fact that major outcomes of human service 
provision are hard to measure; and the insight that means-end relations prove 
fuzzy in many situations. Under these circumstances, street-level authority 
employed for dealing with complex conditions in human development tends to 
become constrained, since public policies and administrative steering models, 
on the one hand, and management devices within organizations, on the other, 
discipline those providing services on the ground. 
All this is a cross-sectoral pattern, notwithstanding some gradual differences 
between the areas considered above. Interestingly, however, there are pressures 
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to avoid hard implications resulting from this development, and these pressures 
appear in both the public sphere and organizational settings. On either side, 
perceived shortcomings provoke action to mitigate consequences of the ‘gov-
erning by numbers’. Attempts to compensate for what numeric rationalization 
cuts off from ‘human development rationality’ are multi-faceted. Thus, the 
informal bending of formal prescriptions is widespread, with organizational 
improvisation being the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, to respond to 
(publicly) discussed failures and related disquietude, social (and healthcare) 
policies resort to institutional improvisation – that is, ad-hoc programs meant to 
alleviate the aforementioned crowding out effect. The result of this twofold 
improvisation, however, is permanent strain on those expected to organize or 
provide human services properly. 
In the light of the social theory reviewed in the first section of this article, 
things appear quite intricate. Throughout the public sphere (and supposedly 
among the wider citizenry), human development (or social reproduction) is still 
viewed as an agenda that differs from economic instrumentalism. Typical ser-
vices are more than ever expected to be delivered in an effective way, at any 
rate and (often) for any citizen. At the same time, numeric rationalization is 
understood as a way to make this expectation come true, with the contemporary 
perfectionist ‘zeitgeist’ promoting the idea of evidenced performance, similar 
to the one used for private businesses. This is a major gateway through which 
the rationale embodied by the (capitalistic) economic system finds its way into 
the human service industry. Aside from commercial interests in taking over 
part of that industry, it is a perfectionist (world-) culture spilling over to all 
societal sectors that encourages the business-like managing ‘by numbers’ with-
in both public administration and major provider organizations. That said, the 
ensuing results do not always chime with popular expectations influenced by 
the concept of ‘human development rationality’. Thus, additional action is 
required to meet such expectations. Yet as this action is often confined to pro-
visionary adjustments at organizational and institutional level, it remains an 
unfinished endeavour in many instances. 
All this reflects blurred boundaries between societal sectors or systems in a 
configuration in which the interplay of references moving from one (social) 
system to another proves asymmetric overall (Bode 2012a; forthcoming); con-
cerning the kind of rationality shaping relevant day-to-day operations, the 
capitalistic economy impacts on other systems more substantially than vice 
versa. Under these conditions, it seems that the two modes of improvisation 
depicted above prove critical to the maintenance of functional differentiation 
within Western societies. Disruptions are difficult to avoid, as the coping be-
haviour at provider level can never be taken for granted, and because institu-
tional improvisation is anything but sustainable. Thus, welfare arrangements 
become unstable and volatile as a matter of principle. Put in a nutshell: asym-
metric functional differentiating with blurred boundaries makes human service 
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provision less reliable – which is in stark contrast to the actual promise associ-
ated with the ‘governing by numbers’. 
Sociologists are tempted to explore reasons behind this overall development 
in a Western society like Germany. At the risk of oversimplification, one may 
speculate that is has been the radicalization of numeric rationalization within 
the economic system that had a critical impact on the power of that system to 
impose its standards on other societal sectors. At least, what is referred to as 
shareholder (or financialized) capitalism has come with a much higher pressure 
on institutions meant to protect citizens against the vicissitudes of the market 
economy (Morgan 2016; Tridico 2017). It coincides with a growing disen-
gagement of the economic elites (Hartmann 2013) who seem ever less willing 
to accept the logic of ‘human development’ being dominant and politically 
endorsed in some societal sectors. Cultural change among the citizenry may 
have played an important role as well, as major sections of the human service 
industry are affected by rising ‘consumerism’ and a ‘market hype’ seducing 
lower and higher-middle class populations at global scale (Bauman 1998; Fevre 
2017). Thus, it is the encounter of changes in the political economy and in the 
cultural fabric of late modern capitalism that can be assumed to stimulate the 
dynamics depicted in this article. 
However, while numeric rationalization has strong back winds for some 
time now, tensions are palpable between the promise of perfectionism inherent 
in the ‘governing by numbers’ agenda, on the one hand, and the irritating expe-
rience of the welfare state becoming less sensitive to basic requirements of 
human development and social reproduction, on the other. This experience 
seems to stir up countervailing forces, and what has been portrayed as organi-
zational and institutional improvisation in this article is one expression of this. 
Hence, concerning the ‘governing‘ of human service provision, the struggle 
between instrumental rationality and modern ideas of human development will 
go on, with no end of history on the horizon. 
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